Shoham, proposed, a uniform approach to systems for nonmonotonic reasoning, which consists in considering standard logics augmented with a preference relation on the interpretations. Circumscription can easily -seen. to be a special case of this preference logic framework, but capturing default logic turned out to-be, more difficult, and is even thought to be impossible by some researchers of nonmonotonic reasoning. In this paper a preferential model semantics for default logic is given, by defining a preference relation on partial models called hypervaluations. Alternatively, Kripke models for K45 could have been used instead of hypervaluations. The given semantics slightly strengthens Shoham's notion of preferential entailment, and reflection on the question why such a strengthening is necessary provides some insight into the relation between default logic and circumscription.
Hypervaluations
LPL `iS a propositional language built on a set of propositional letters PL and the logical connectives -1 for negation and v for disjunction. A, D, = are assumed to be defined in the usual way. It is well-known that the supervaluation consequence relation is is strictly weaker than the ordinary consequence relation. (See e.g. Langholm (1988) .) The hypervaluation consequence relation I=h is weaker still: PROPOSITION 2.2 lh C I=s c 1=2.
Proof. I=h cl=s c.1=2 is trivial. I=s I=h follows from the fact that {p v q} I=s {p,q}, whereas {p v q} [Ah ,{p,q}. 1=2 1=s follows from. the fact that l2 {p,--gyp}, whereas I#s {p,-,p}.
It is easy to see that l=h, 1=s, and. l=2 coincide in case the consequence set 0 is 0-or a singleton. It is also clear that F l=h A iff for every non-empty hyperinterpretation I (VNV E F 1=h,I yr Proof. It is easy to see that there exists a 1-1 correspondence t between non-empty hyperinterpretations and distinguishable connected S5 models such that VI((p) = T iff µ(I) 1= cp. The equivalence of 1=55, 1=KD45, and I=K45 restricted to boxed formulas is well-known.
The above proposition justifies to some extent the epistemic reading of the hypervaluation consequence relation which was mentioned in ,the introduction, since K(D)45 is widely regarded to be a good candidate for the logic of the beliefs of a rational agent, whereas S5 is often mentioned as a suitable logic of knowledge. Below we mention some properties. of I=h. Let 8 = a.:. (31,.,,Rn / co be a closed default and let F be a set of first-order models. The preference relation corresponding to S, >_g, over pF is defined as follows:
rI >_S r2 iff VME F2M1=2 (X, Hence the only preferred model which is not necessarily CA-maximal is the trivial model 0. Notice that 0 being the only preferred model corresponds to-A having an inconsistent extension or having no extension at all. It is possible to give an alternative definition of CA such that 0 E nA iff A has an inconsistent extension and nA = 0 iff A has no extension. However, this alternative Co will in general not be a strict partial ordering, since for any pr = (M,,I=,C) with finite n and s.p.o. C we have Ttpr # 0. The collapsing of the cases that A has an inconsistent extension and that 0 has no extension can be defended by pointing out that both are boundary cases added for technical convenience, rather than representations of belief states of truly rational agents. (In both cases a rational agent would have to revise his belief state.) An immediate corollary of proposition 3.10(iv) is the monotony of Tho. Hence as long as you-keep the -default -theory constant, the reasoning is monotonic. Default consequence is nonmonotonic because default theories are updated in the light of new information. To capture this in terms of preferential model semantics, we propose a strengthening of the notion of preferential consequence and we define a preferential model semantics for a class of default theories with the, same defaults. The strong notion of preferential consequence is equivalent to the usual notion in case the models are two-valued. Applied to hypervaluations, the strong notion takes account of the intuition that default extensions-the preferred models of default theory-have to be grounded on the facts. The definition of a p.m.s. associated with a class of defaults is a global version of the corresponding definition for a single default theory. In view of proposition 2.4 it is no surprise that one can also obtain a modal preferential model semantics for default logic. There is a quite obvious reformulation of the above results in terms of K45 models instead of hypervaluations. The use of KD45 or S5 is less straightforward since these logics lack models matching inconsistent extensions. If one assumes extensions to be consistent, then, from a technical point of view, default rules can be interpreted as well in terms of (KD45-)belief as in terms of (S5-)knowledge. See Voorbraak (forthcoming).
4= Discussion
We have given-a preferential model-semantics for default-consequence understood in the 'meet' or'sceptical' -sense. (y is a-sceptical default consequence of Niff 9-is-true-in every extension of A.) Makinson (1989) has shown that credulous default consequence ((p is a credulous default consequence of A iff (p is true in some (arbitrarily chosen) extension of A) does not satisfy cumulative transitivity (I' c A c Cn(I') = Cn(A) c Cn(I')) and can therefore not be captured in a.p.m.s. (Makinson's result that Thpi satisfies cumulative transitivity also holds for, Thpr*.) Sceptical default consequence does satisfy cumulative transitivity, although it is still not a cumulative consequence operation, since it does not satisfy cumulative monotony (I' c A c Cn(I') = .Cn(I') c Cn(A)).
A -failure of cumulative monotony implies: that (implicitly) facts and derived formulas have a different status. But nonmonotonic formalisms which distinguish -facts from derived formulas _may very well be cumulative: The-failure of-cumulative monotony in default logic = = = =b 7 seems to be a corollary of the -requirement that extensions have to--be grounded on the facts. Learning new facts, even previously derivable ones, can result in more grounded (partial) world descriptions. This might be defended -by -taking -the difference between facts and derived formulas serious. Alternatively, one could argue that one should not require that the logic is cumulative, but rather that the state of belief of an ideally rational agent-should not contain -a set of defaults D such that ThD* fails cumulative monotony.
In a forthcoming paper (Voorbraak (forthcoming)) `we argue that both default and superstrongly autoepistemic extensions can be obtained by applying essentially only two different filters, which can roughly be described as taking justification-minimal models and taking grounded models, respectively. A model is called justification-minimal iff the set of false justifications is minimal. Justification minimization is implemented in default logic by requiring the _>D-maximal elements to be stable, it is implemented in autoepistemic logic by strengthening minimal AE extensions to superstrongly grounded AE extensions, and it is closely related to the minimization in circumscription.
The groundedness filter requires the extensions of a default theory (D,W) to be >_D MOD(W) and AE extensions to be -minimal.-This groundedness filter is not applied in circumscription. This more or less explains -why we need a stronger °version of preferential consequence for default logic than for circumscription.-
